In the free treatment of the Greeks, every philosophical doctrine, indeed every conception had its own independent life, and the ethic of Plato or Aristotle can be understood and appreciated without taking into consideration how, in their view, the existence of the world and the coherence of it is to be explained. This is not the case with modern philosophy. The consistency through which alone it aims to gain all its knowledge, establishes the particular in its whole existence on initial assumptions. Each branch of philosophy stands and falls with the uppermost philosophical view. Therefore, for insight into the newer philosophy of law it is absolutely necessary that the entire system of philosophy be considered, and that the former be considered only as a consequence thereof. This is true not only of the particular form of natural law, which the founders of the particular systems have given it, but quite as much for its general development. Because its entire existence is a result of the viewpoint of abstract philosophy in general.

Essence of rationalism

The essence of abstract philosophy is: only accept what follows from reason – the logically necessary. That something exists, is not sufficient; the opposite must be impossible. Each specific content with which reason is filled, is manifested for it initially as random, as something that could just as well be another. What cannot be thought otherwise if it is to remain reason, is itself alone, what it is, its own laws, forms and determinations, for example, the rule that something cannot be its opposite at the same time, the idea of ​​the one and the many, the finite and the infinite, the relation of cause and effect, etc. Only that which already contains these has the character of logical necessity. That something follows from reason is the same thing as saying: anything else would cancel the conditions of thought. Hence, pure reason – thought prior to all content outside itself – is the principle of abstract philosophy. What it contains, is also to be recognized from itself, prior to all experience (a priori). And on the other hand, that which is known through experience can never have the character of logical necessity. For experience shows only that something is, never that the opposite would be unthinkable.[1]

Everything that is supposed to be tested, must therefore be found pure a priori. This is true of the things of everyday perception no less than the invisible objects of faith. The proof of the existence of God, for example can only be conducted when it is shown that the non-existence of its concept, which one has to construct apart from any experience, is a contradiction (the ontological proof); the proof of the immortality of the soul, if the characteristics of which the concept of the soul consists, logically exclude mortality.

What all investigation and cognition have in common is to have, as standard, reason in a negative sense, i.e., to eliminate everything that contradicts the laws of thought. The peculiarity of this orientation is to have reason as a positive standard: only to recognize what these laws already contain in themselves, and to exclude anything that in terms of them might be this way, might be that. Insights should be found not merely by reason, but from reason. Reason is not to be the means and organ, but the source of knowledge; it is not through its activity to find a content lying outside of itself, but to find the entire content solely from its own nature and its laws. That is why this orientation is appropriately referred to as rationalism. It is like looking at the eye as the source of light, and wishing to see faces not by looking at objects, but from the internal structure of the eye and its analysis.

Motivation for rationalism

The motivation for this is not skepticism; because the philosopher who destroyed the world by means of abstraction, has in advance the hope of rebuilding it from himself. Also not only admiration of the intellect. Because this in itself, as experience shows regarding the Greeks, leads to seeking meaning in things, not to abstracting from them; but the interest of freedom is connected with it.

The independence and inwardness of man (the principle of subjectivity) is what propels the entire history of the modern age, the European-Germanic populace – this is an insight that has been spread among us for a long time. It has become the basis of the current aesthetic view. Regarding the legal institutions and the formation of states of the Germanic tribes, it is also recognized that their origin consisted in free self-determination and personal ties. In this way, scientific research strives against the coercion which the objects outside of it exercise on it. One comprehends when one allows something to impact him, to be determined by it. Cognition [Erkennen] presupposes recognition [Anerkennen]. The Germanic spirit – liberated by the Reformation from the church’s authority and energized in its innermost depth – does not wish to be determined by anything but what it itself determines. A world pre-existing outside itself acts oppressively upon it, it is a foreign power, to which it is to submit against its will. It frees itself from that world by abstraction and refuses to submit as long as it finds no compulsion to do so within itself. Only when the thought determinations themselves demand it, is room made for that existence; since then the recognition is based on one’s own existence, not on the other’s. Such disdain to accept the real as real because not derivative of self would have to be counted as the greatest pride, if it were certain that it occurred with arbitrariness. But this process is reflected in the entire development without awareness of choice and intention. It permeates all branches of knowledge and builds at least the scientific form even for the positive content. It is as if scientific treatment could not otherwise go about its business. Therefore reason is also well defended, in general; but the attempt to justify its particular use, which is the important thing, is not even made, because one believes it not to be possible for the particular, but only for the general and sole. And indeed, the possibility of abstraction leads of itself and almost inevitably to this conclusion, until the full trial first brings home the enterprise and its necessary conclusion, and so secures it against that.

All philosophy, namely, is only intended either to obtain a guarantee for specific results (God, immortality, etc.), or to recognize the unity in the mass of diverse things. The former can be called its practical, the latter its theoretical interest. Both are universally human and eternal. It must look for something unconditioned for both purposes, which imparts warranty and unity to all others. If it is possible for human consciousness, through reflection, to break away from all existence outside of it, to fake even for a moment that it is alone, that everything else apart from it either does not exist at all or does so in a very different character than it really is: what is more natural than to seek that supreme guarantee in what one can no longer think away – one’s own existence, and thought itself? The desire to gain certainty about God and immortality, to rescue them from the destruction of that flood of thought washing everything away, must lead to the attempt as to whether they were not already given in those first assumptions. The same free activity of thought that is cognizant of the ability to accept or not to accept any existence, the validity of any commandment, also removes the correspondence between man and the world. It has found what the Greeks stipulated in vain, a position outside of the world and thus a capacity to act against it. It is itself its own world. It stipulates recognition by necessity, it feels everything to be dependent solely on its caprice. It is no longer incorporated into the world, and when it wishes to eliminate the contradiction and restore unity, no attempt lies closer to hand than to incorporate the world into itself, in its thought determinations to find the world’s coherence with it, like it finds this in itself. If all of this is achieved, then it appears to it and to the thought pertaining to it, to be the harmony in all things, the only cause from which it imagines something existing to be such; and it possesses for its desired results the confirmation that it alone can be sufficient, its own existence. It has achieved what all philosophy desires, and has achieved such in the manner that its instinct and sense of independence wished for. In the early period, the practical interest is still predominant. It proves the immortality of the soul – of which the reality is, that we can only be certain of it through faith in the revelations and promises of God – from the characteristics of the soul (its intangibility, its non-composedness), thus in a way that God Himself could not annihilate or make mortal if He wanted to, any more than He could make a round triangle. Later, from the time of Fichte this interest recedes completely, leaving only the interest of the scientific quantity of deriving the world from one’s own reason.

Progression of rationalism

This explains the entire process. Philosophy must find everything from reason, in accordance with reason. The motive of abstraction – to have the absolute in itself – is also the restriction on one’s own thinking and existence. Beyond that, one might just think away even this, and how then could anything be found? That is what is meant when philosophy supposedly emanates from nothing. Abstraction is immediately carried out until some very simple idea, of which one cannot divest himself if he exists and thinks, which underlies all thinking, e.g., substance, the concept of being, the unconditioned, and the like. From these remains of abstraction – the simplest that reason contains – must proceed all determinate existence. And this again according to reason, the merely logical. It must contain things such that their opposite is unthinkable. That applies just as much to the systems of necessary opposition, which have to build one thing against the other (Fichte, Hegel), as from those which merely infer from the principle of contradiction. In both, science can accept no object, no concept as something that is there; but it must itself build everything in its own way, by showing that with the preceding – beginning with the first assumption – this as well is posited according to the laws of thought, and their non-existence or being-other is a logical impossibility. Something must then in the same way be possible for it and incumbent to it, conversely, objects apprehended in some manner should be resolvable into the simplicity from which it made them. This is the meaning and the high importance of definitions. The characteristics of the definition should be entirely adequate to the defined, exhaust the matter; these features, even redefined in the same way, should be able to be converted into already given general ideas. In such a way one is to arrive at that which is simple, the general substance. It is, when one completes it, the transition backward, which the philosophical system aims to take forward.

Thus all living coherence in the world is now repealed, freedom is impossible, the relationship of cause and effect is only appearance, in truth everything is as it is in logic and geometry, simply ground and consequence. Every cause, namely, can be distinguished in its effects not only in thought but also in reality. It is possible for the former to be present and the latter not to occur, for example, if the sprouting of the seed is suppressed. In addition therefore to a positive cause, one can, where it has occurred, accept a negative one, the non-existence of possible prevention. Yes, it is at least conceivable that the cause itself is free either to produce the effect or not to, for example, a man and an action. Time – it might now be a true or a false idea in itself – at least refers correctly and clearly to the relationship of cause and effect, separating them both. By contrast, in the logical context the generating and the generated – ground and consequence – can be kept apart in thought but not in reality, for example, the nature of the triangle and its consequence that its three angles together are equal to two right angles. We cannot put the notion of time between them, or think of prevention either by the will of the ground or in any other way. We know, as soon as the ground is there before all investigation, that the consequence is likewise inevitable, because it is not apart from it, it is the thing itself. Therefore, if all existence is inferred from the initial assumption according to reason, then that existence must already be given in it apart from any process, and it is inconceivable that any thing could have been done differently than it is, or rather that it should be different than it is. And rationalism must stand fast on this conceptualization. For if any free production were to exist in the world, i.e., something else likewise feasible and conceivable, then it could not know from mere thought determinations that precisely this is real. And what follows from reason, cannot be the result of a process, an act, otherwise it would not have existed before these events, and it would really have been a logical contradiction. Just as little can things be exhaustively defined when they are effects and not mere consequences. The radius being logically contained in a circle, is absolutely nothing other than everything else that is already given for all circles. By contrast, the son as engendered by the father, is not characterized even by his descent therefrom and by everything posited by the concept of the father.

Reason as principle of philosophy, therefore, does not tolerate any happening, any creation, endures nothing new, only that which is adventitious. It is nothing more than what follows from it, and what follows from it could never be lacking, because it is it itself. The entire development of abstract philosophy is really continually driven forward by one single postulate: There is no change! This postulate necessarily led – as will be shown below – from the early stage to Kant’s, and thus connects the new systems with the ones preceding his.

Contrast with the historical viewpoint

The historical view, which, it was alleged above, the Greeks lacked, here is thus virtually denied. This now emphasizes all the more that the historical view is not to be understood as if there were eternal change without unity of purpose and control, or as if the past had a higher value than the present, or that one would know nothing if events had not already preceded, from which one can learn. Just the opposite of all this! In fact, that view is historical according to which something has happened and is happening, according to which there is a free act. Schelling called the Christian view of the world the historical as opposed to the logical of modern philosophy. For according to the latter, the world and all particular things are necessarily contained in the essence of God, while according to the latter it only arose (happened) through His voluntary creation. I have referred to the Judeo-Christian view of ethics as historical because according to it, law is law because God willed it so. Thus man had the ethos before any incident of his own; but he has it only by the act of God; it does not exist by itself with the concept of its existence or of being in general. And the past is not the higher, but the present, and the future is the highest; because God leads the world and the law to it – just as the peculiarity of the Historical School of Jurisprudence, as will be shown below, consists in nothing other than having its ultimate foundation herein.

Herein likewise lies the difference between negative and positive knowledge. What is found from reason (a priori) is, according to Schelling’s deeply significant expression, only the “not-not-capable of being,” not the “existing” [Seiende]. Thus for example, that the triangle has three angles that together add up to two right angles, that, as Wolff deduces, “seeing is the property of an animal with eyes” (thus a seeing animal), is only a negative knowledge; on the other hand, that the earth is round and not triangular, that there are plants and animals, this is positive knowledge. Another would not be unthinkable. Positive knowledge and object of positive knowledge is, if I may put it in an absolute and exhaustive manner, the person, his specific primevally determined (i.e., holiness, the love of God, etc.), his act and the product of his act. Therefore, it is merely negative knowledge that there is a being, a power, a ground, by which the world exists, because the opposite would be contrary to logical concepts; on the other hand, it is positive knowledge that there is a God in the true sense, a personal, self-conscious creator, likewise that this God is gracious and merciful. It is positive knowledge when we consider the world to be the act and creation of God, and only negative knowledge when we consider them to be the eternally necessary consequence of reason. Philosophy which derives all knowledge from reason, can have no other than negative knowledge.

According to that view, then, the completely filled All is merely an emanation of empty determinations of thought. God is the remainder of abstraction, referred to above. The latter, and thus God Himself, is likewise the world – logically, it is contained in Him. This is logical pantheism, which rationalism necessarily must confess or else give up its peculiar method, that is, itself. Different things were adopted in the different systems as that most simple, which is where the abstraction has to halt – thus, as the God of the world of reason. For Spinoza and Hegel it is general being (for the former as real, for the latter as thought), for Kant the notion of ​​the categorical, necessity itself, for Fichte the I (the concept of self-consciousness). But all assumptions can be traced back to a dual basis, the real existence of the thinker (the I) and the pure determinations of thought. Both principles, as we have shown, are given necessarily with the abstract method, they alone are what remains. Therefore, they confront us immediately in the motto of the first founder of this orientation: cogito, ergo sum. But they are in conflict with each other. In terms of its essence, the real existence of that which thinks [das Denkenden] is living, acting, generating something outside itself as effect. Reason, however, is dormant, ready from the start, including in itself everything it has produced as a result. The former is free, self-determining and freedom-demanding; the latter is merely determined, necessary, and necessity-imposing. Therefore, what is built on the one is destroyed by the other; thought-necessity abolishes the freedom of the I, and the free activity of the I does not allow everything to be thought-necessity. They thereby certify the falsehood of the motive which they both encouraged in the form – the form in which they could not be carried out simultaneously.

Subjective and objective rationalism

These principles, depending on whether the one or the other is used as a basis, separate the systems in two main directions. The one may be called subjective rationalism, the other objective rationalism. According to the latter, impersonal reason is God, while for the former – if it could be accomplished – it is thinking man himself. The representative of the former is Spinoza, the latter Fichte. These principles come into conflict in the individual systems themselves and in the various branches of science. Above all, this manifests itself in the philosophy of law. The law of reason continually receives the impetus for its development only from the vain attempt to unite these basics, and only from out of them is it possible to look into its innermost working. However, since the living cause of the entire orientation, against the power of which no consequence arises, is only independent personal existence, then of course subjective rationalism must predominate. Right after Spinoza it attains predominance, and maintains it up until Fichte. Only in the modern period has it been ousted and all power again turned to the objective, namely through Hegel’s system. For there arose a sure knowledge that the severance of people from the world does not lead to the true, and this was believed to have been avoided by objective rationalism. But this is deception. Pure thought, which it makes into a principle, may not be the person of the thinker; but it nevertheless has no existence elsewhere than in the abstracting individual. Hereby one connected his person to suitable forms of thought, but not to the creation. And if one absolutely refuses to refer all particular existence to a cause that is not in us, recognizing it only insofar as the determinations of thought that are inseparable from our consciousness contain it, then nothing else could have prompted this than the subjective motive whereby man in his isolation wishes to be the center of creation.

Objective rationalism, where it acts sincerely, is also well aware that it denies a personal God and the historical creation. This is not always so with subjective rationalism. It is wont to invoke the scholastic distinction between the principle of being and the principle of cognition. Reason will not be accepted as what causes things, but only as what our knowledge of them causes. With such a vocation, one can be less deceived with general systems of philosophy, which go back to the utmost, than with individual doctrines, for example, in theology and in natural law. –

Logical pantheism

Since reason as principium, as the beginning, is abstained from, likewise what is meant here is not a merely negative measure, but rather one which is added as a second to the positive one that only has to ascertain its conceivability. The distinction nevertheless has weight when reason is taken simply as the beginning and starting point of the investigation, as a fact which needs first to be explained – not as the ground which alone gives the explanation. For then it would immediately have to go beyond itself. One would have to call for help from laws outside of it to attain to the principle of things. If, for example, I explain the existence of a Creator by the fact of my existence and my reason-forms, then this takes place according to a rule learned from experience. For according to which logical laws is a Creator given in the concept of my existence, such as follows from the forms of pure reason, and that it is not me myself that is the Eternal One?[2] If one had now arrived at the true principle, so would the method immediately take on its abiding shape according to the nature of this principle, which does not already contain reason. If, for example, this principle were a personal almighty Creator, such as rationalistic theologians have found it to be, then one would have to see that such cannot have been prescribed to it, it can only do and have done those things from which it could not refrain; for example, there could be no miracles, simply because reason can produce nothing other than what it must produce.[3] With such a method (no longer mere rational inference, but empirical-historical) there would then be no reason as to why pure thought is made the starting-point, and not rather our whole manifold-filled nature, thought and desire, volition and conscience, and the endless supply accumulated in him through experience and history. This totality as undeniable fact would be the effect which one would have to assume to find the cause, likewise with the help of our whole faculty of cognition, the forms of thought, observation, intellectual vision, even intuition. For we only need to conceive of ourselves as the simple, when we seek the logical unity of the world in ourselves.

The difference of the scientific course as here described, appears to me to have been meant by Plato in the sixth book of his Republic, and he would have delineated it more clearly if he had known rational philosophy in its modern iteration. There he esteems the mathematical and similar sciences to be lower and insufficient, because they abstract general forms from visible things, and from these abstractions as assumption attain to results, which then, in order to have some meaning, need the sensible things out of which (not from which) they were obtained. True science, on the other hand, must first explicate backwards. It must start from the objects, certainly, but consider them to be conditioned [bedingte] and therefore seek not that which is in them (the general form), but an independent cause outside them as the unconditioned. If it goes to work like this, then it will, when it has ascended to this unconditioned, no longer need the sensible things from which it proceeded, but move among the pure forms. Among these figures (εῖδος) Plato understands certainly not that which is without specific content, the abstract, but rather the opposite of the sensible (αἰσθητόν) the intellectual, in constant freedom, not inhibited by any immovable substance, acting – the creative archetypes and counsels of God.

But all this is the precisely opposed to rational philosophy, including the subjective. Pure thought is the beginning. With this, we directly relinquish the creaturely character. According to the pure consciousness of existence and the pure forms of thought, we would have to consider it eternal if it only were possible to abstract from the particular sensations that we have at every moment, and the changing ideas with which we must fill those forms. Further, with this thinking as starting point, explication can only occur in the forward direction, according to its own laws. What then results, cannot be a cause outside of it, but only a consequence in it. If with the existence of reason – as required – everything that truly should be, is already logically necessarily posited, then there is no need for a Creator outside of it, and according to the same laws of logical necessity, there cannot even be one. If one were to posit him, thereby making the concept of Him real – erroneously, because what it requires of existence must also be there even without a Creator, as necessary as logic itself – then the Creator Himself could only be a creature of reason as the higher Creator, as can be seen from the Kantian proofs of God. –

It therefore comes as no surprise that the logical systems lead to atheism. Rationalism does not first end there, it has already begun there. The question, for which the receipt of certainty regarding its affirmation is the practical interest of all philosophy and also of this one, it immediately, prior to any investigation, has already denied by its own method. – Admittedly the abstract method largely lingers in the middle, unconscious of its basic requirement and its inevitable outcome, thus contenting itself with eliminating details the logical needlessness of which is evident.

Spinoza and his view of law

Spinoza is the example to which all later efforts of this sort, even when battling among themselves, refer as the most solid model. That does not come from his exceptional intelligence alone, but also from the special nature of his scientific work. All the later philosophers namely conduct specifically rationalistic systems. Spinoza, however, did nothing else than set up the canon of rationalism itself. Thus with him it is the magnificence of the enterprise, without the pettiness and inconvenience which in the execution (for example, by Fichte and Hegel) it inevitably gets caught up in. And he, like everyone devoted to him, can find no doubts and no difficulty against his view, because he does not try to put it to the test. He assumes that the only thing in the world is rational coherence. And now he does not show how specific objects really follow from reason, but only of what sort at all their coherence with it and with each other must be, according to that assumption. What he says about this cannot be refuted, because, as we are accustomed to repeat, it is true. One simply has to deny the assumption itself, the rational coherence of the world.

The essential content of his teaching therefore consists merely in the character traits of rationalism, which here, as with the generalities of every logical system, are given:

The Unconditional (causa sui) can only be that the existence of which follows from its concepts (i.e., the non-existence of which would be logically contradictory), and that is Being itself (substance), this is God. There can only be One and a Simple (because the original idea of ​​thought is necessarily empty, undifferentiated, therefore simple and indivisible). Every cause must lead inevitably to its effect, that is to say, there is no cause and effect, but everything stands in the correlation of cause and effect. All specific things are only necessary consequences (affections) of pure Being (God). He is in them like the essence of the stone (lapideitas) is in individual stones. He has no mind and will, He had no freedom to create the world or not to create it; rather, He contains the world according to necessary laws. There is no freedom at all, as little for God as for men. We consider our actions to be free because we do not know their causes. For what is there, and therefore every individual action, is only a consequence of general necessity, already given with the substance itself, therefore inevitable, etc.

An ethics in true sense cannot be expected of Spinoza; for the essence of objective rationalism excludes the freedom of the actor. The world law is everything, no action takes place that did not follow logically from it (from God). Anything that happens there therefore cannot help but be lawful, be good and right. Injustice would only be that which did not follow from this necessity, but precisely for this reason is also not possible – “what no one wants and no one is capable of.” Human beings can act against religion (the revealed), but not against the eternal law of God. There is therefore no injustice, no sin. What we call such refers only to the consequence that an action has for us, for the well-being of people, not to its intrinsic character. The objection that there is evil in the world, is thereby obviated, in that it is denied and the notion of it is declared to be a sham. Spinoza’s whole view of the law is only the execution of this idea. People need to enter into the state, bear its dominion, in order to gain security; because nature drives them to choose the lesser of two evils. If they did not enter into the state, then nature has effected this as well and they do no injustice thereby. By combining, the government gains power over all, and therefore law. It can order what it wishes, because it can; citizens must obey because they are unable to resist. The government must ensure the public good, because this consideration is a lesser evil than imminent rebellion and thereby doom. But if it does not wish to, it does so at its peril, it does no injustice because nature has given it the power to do. Citizens may not transfer their rights fully and unconditionally to the government; that is, it is physically impossible to give up their (natural) power completely and forever. If they could, the government would no longer be obliged to govern well, namely, it would no longer have the mechanical impulse to that end.[4] Seemingly and in terms of a literal reading, Spinoza’s view of law has the same basis as Aristotle’s, nature, the power of generating everything by necessity. But a closer examination shows most clearly the difference between the empirical and the abstract method. Aristotle recognizes a nature with characteristic laws and purposes which his thought does not possess, which he learns from observation. Spinoza’s nature at bottom is nothing other than the abstraction of a logical necessity. Aristotle always derives new data for his knowledge from the world around him, he finds an existence of an entirely different sort in conscious than in unconscious nature, and accommodates his knowledge to this, here laying down freedom and true ethos. Spinoza, closed to any experience, to everything newly adventitious, holds firmly to his initial assumption, conversely forms the objects according to the shape of his knowledge, denies freedom and ethos. For Aristotle the equitable is: what happens in nature analogously to free beings. For Spinoza it is: what happens by nature itself, and that is all.

Standpoint of natural law

So the peculiarity of objective rationalism is that, carried out logically, it allows for no ethics. All actions that can occur are given with the initial adoption of general substance by ineluctable necessity. Even the question regarding justice has to cease, because it would foresee an independence and a being-torn-away from this general necessity. But the logical interest which is satisfied thereby is only derivative. The original does not want causality of the laws of thought, but of living people, and this calls for a doctrine of obligation that recognizes his power and freedom, makes his personality the center, because allowing the realization of logical deduction to depend on him first. Such is the natural law as it has progressed from Grotius up to most recent times. Natural law thus owes its existence and formation to subjective rational philosophy. This, because it emanates not only from reason, but also from the existence of the thinker, is at once aware of the freedom that comes from thinking of putting what is required into action or not; it therefore derives from reason only the prescriptions, but leaves actions to be effected by the free person. So the prerequisite of ethics is not lacking. For this it eschews the postulate that everything is just reason, since free actions, which it admits, may just as well be made against reason. This is the distinction between natural law and the legal view of Spinoza, indeed between subjective and objective rationalism in general. The basis and the characteristics of natural law are already given with the generic characterization of abstract philosophy and need to be detected only in the particular subject matter. For in no scientific orientation can the treatment proceed so evenly as in this, the essence of which is precisely to regard the newly created not as something newly generated from the appertaining life principle, but as given with the universal in terms of its concept. Natural law takes on a different shape when it appears as an integral part of a universal (subjective-rationalist) system, with Kant and Fichte, or where it is independently formed from such an isolated doctrine, from Grotius up until recent times; whether because its cultivator is not accustomed to philosophy as a whole, or that his philosophy consisted of individual areas without connection. In the latter it is more dominated by the peculiarity of the object, while in the former more by the specific, often random results of theoretical philosophy for this object. It will thus be altogether appropriate to depict the development of natural law first according to its general motives along the lines of the subject matter, then according to its peculiar shape in the individual systems along the lines of preeminent compilers.

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[1] “Experience teaches us that something is furnished in this or that manner, but not that it could not be something else.” Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason], p. 3.

[2] Similar reasoning also refutes this kind of demonstration by Kant (Kritik der Urtheilskraft [Critique of Judgment], pp. 331ff.).

[3] See for this generally, Kant’s Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der bloβen Vernunft [Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason], Fourth Piece, Part One.

[4] See the entirety of Spinoza’s Ethics and Theological-Political Treatise.